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This  paper  analyzes  wage  elasticities  using  a  panel  dataset  of more  than  3000  large 
Belgian firms over the period 1986-94. We explore various functional forms  and find that 
the  short  run  wage  elasticiy  is  unity,  while  the  long  run  is  -1.25.  These  results  are 
striking  for  they  are  much  larger  than  those  reported  in  previous  studies  using  macro 
economic time  series  data.  Due to  the micro economic nature of the  data it is  possible to 
take  a number of important factors  into  account which is  not possible  if one  uses  macro 
data.  In  particular,  we  explicitly  model  firm  heterogeneity  and  we  treat  the  wage  as 
endogenous.  The results reported in this paper can have an important impact on economic 
policy and wage negotiations between the social partners in Belgium. I. Introduction 
Recently,  there  exists  an  increasing  concern  among  politicians,  economists  and  business 
men over high labour costs and  inflexible labour markets as  one of the main causes of the 
high unemployment rate  in the  European  Union.  This  concern  is  fed  by  the  institutional 
structure of many European labour markets and  t..lJ.e  increased competition from low  wage 
countries  in  South  East  Asia  and  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  While  the  OECD  in  its 
recent job study  blames  inflexible labour markets,  high minimum wages  and  institutional 
factors  typical for European countries for  the high and persisting unemployment problem 
in Europe,  others  search for  causes  which  are  in general  not  related  to  labour costs  for 
explaining  high  unemployment  (Freeman,  1995).  The  facts. are  that  the  European 
unemployment rate is much higher than in North America, labour markets are more rigid, 
reflected in lower gross job turnover (i.e.  the  sum of gross job creation and  destruction) 
and labour costs and taxes are much higher. 
In this paper we  investigate the effect of labour costs on the demand for labour by using a 
unique  micro  level  dataset  of more  than 3000  Belgian companies.  Economists concerned 
with economic  policy to  stimulate employment have  a particular interest  in the  estimates 
of wage elasticities.  Thus  to  predict the  impact of tax  changes,  wage  subsidies,  etc.  it  is 
important to have an idea of the underlying parameter estimates.  Although,  Belgium is  by 
no  means  a  representative  country  for  the  European  Union,  it  is  one  of  the  more 
interesting economies  to  analyze given its  high and persistent unemployment rate  putting 
Belgium in the  class  of countries of high unemployment in the  European Union (just like 
Spain  and  Ireland).  Moreover,  Belgium  is  a  small  open  economy  and  therefore  it  is 
subject  to  competitive  pressure  in  international  markets.  Economic  policy  makers 
concerned  with  international competition can view  Belgium  as  a good  test case  given its 
export oriented market. 
The  approach  in  this  paper  is  fairly  basic,  yet  fundamental  to  the  problem.  We  are 
interested  in  the  elasticity  of the  demand  for  labour.  Although  this  is  a  basic  question 
there has  been relatively little work on estimating demand functions  for labour as  stressed 
1 by Hamermesh (1993). Most of the literature has used macro economic time series data to 
estimate  long  and  short  run  wage  elasticities,  yielding  relatively  low  values1•  Estimates 
for  Belgium using macro economic time  series usually  reveal  a short run wage  elasticity 
of about  -0.15  and  a  long  run  of about  -0.40  depending  on  the  underlying  economic 
model  and  time  period  used  (Sneesens  and  Dreze,  1986;  Sneessens  and  Mehta,  1990). 
Reviewing the  literature Hamermesh (1993) concluded that a good guess  for the  long run 
elasticity  is  about  -0.45.  Those  low  elasticities  can  be  explained  in  various  ways,  they 
might be  the  result of a specific model specifcation,  the  lack of variation in a number of 
variables,  the  lack of a sufficient number of observations,  the  impossibility to  control for 
firm  idiosyncracies  or  other  non-aggregate  effects  or  they  might  truely  reflect  low 
elasticities. If  the latter is  the case then we  should not pay that much attention to  the role 
of wages  in employment determination,  but perhaps  focus  on  other factors  like  demand 
shocks  or technological  progress  (Mortensen and  Pissarides,  1995,  Bean,  1995).  Howe-
ver,  before exploring those  issues  it is  necessary  to  obtain some  idea about the impact of 
wage costs on labour demand in firms. 
In  the  following  sections  we  will  investigate  labour  demand  elasiticities  taking  into 
account institutional aspects  and  firm  specific technology  in an  implicit way.  To  this  end 
we use a unique panel dataset of more than 3,000 Belgium firms over the period 1986-94. 
The advantages  of using micro economic data rather than macro economic are numerous. 
Firstly,  due  to  the  combination  of  large  cross-sections  being  followed  over  time  the 
degrees  of freedom  in  statistical  inferences  increase  dramatically  which  increases  the 
reliability of the results.  Secondly,  due to  the nature of firm level panel data it is  possible 
to  take  into account firm heterogeneity.  Recent research  pays  increasingly more attention 
to  the  impact  of firm  heterogeneity  in economic  analysis,  in  particular  when  analysing 
firm level employment behaviour.  For instance  Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) for the  US 
and  Konings  (1995)  for  the  UK  show  that  at  all  phases  of the  business  cycle  and  even 
within narrowly defined sectors  and  regions  firms  simultaneously create and destroy jobs. 
If only  macro  economic  data  are  used  it  is  not  possible  to  take  into  account  those 
enterprise  level  idiosyncracies.  A  third  reason  why  the  use  of  micro  panel  data  is 
1  See  Hamermesh  (1993)  for  a survey  of the  literature. 
2 advisable  is  the  easy  availability  of appropriate  instruments  for  endogenous  exlanatory 
variables which we will discuss  in more detail below (Arellano and Bond,  1991). 
In  the  second  section  we  give  a  general  theoretical  background.  The  third  section 
describes  the  basic  characteristics  of the  data,  the  econometric  model  and  methodology. 
We discuss the results in the fourth section and conclude the paper in section five. 
II. Theoretical Background 
The  standard,  static  theory  of (long  run)  labour  demand  can  be  derived  from  a  cost 
minimization problem under the constraint of a given production plan yielding a conditio-
nal  demand for  labour as  a function of relative factor prices and pianned output.  Variati-
ons  in the  form  of the  labour demand  functions  can be tracked  back to  the  assumptions 
made  about production,  i.e.  Cobb-Douglas,  CES,  translog,  generalized Leontief (see also 
Hamermesh,  1986).  In  case  of  a  two  factor  (labour  and  capital)  approach  the  Cobb-
Douglas  production  function  is  often used  which  yields  the  following  static  (long  run) 
demand for labour, 
(1) 
where  L*  stands  for  the  log  of desired  employment,  w  is  the  log  of the  unit  cost  of 
labour,  r is  the  log of the  unit cost of capital  and  y is  the  log of output.  The  coefficient 
on  output  gives  an  idea  about  scale  economies,  while  the  coefficient  on  labour  costs 
equals  the  negative  of the  coefficient on the  cost  of capital.  This  last  constraint derives 
from the homogeneity assumption of production. 
Equation  (1),  however,  ignores  any  dynamic  aspect  of employment.  Apart  from  the 
traditional costs  of labour (wages)  a firm  incurs  other transactions  costs  when it hires  or 
fires  workers.  Those  costs  ensure  that a firm's  demand  for  labour does  not only  depend 
on  current  exogenous  factors,  but  also  on  past  employment  levels  and  on  expectations 
3 about the future  level of such factors2•  If  the firm adjusts  with a lag to changes in output 
or relative prices,  differences  between the current labour  input and the  long run demand 
may  arise.  The  simplest way  to  incorporate  this  process  in equation (1)  is  by assuming 
that  labour  adjusts  according  to  (2),  where  A  is  an  exogenously  given  adjustment 
parameter. 
(2) 
Substituting (1) in (2) yields 
(3) 
Note  that  {31  gives  a  direct  estimate  of the  adjustment  parameter  for  {31  =  1  - A.  A 
constraint in (3)  is  that the explanatory  variables have the  same lag  structure and that all 
adjustment  is  via employment.  This  is  a  consequence  of assuming  static expectations. If 
this  assumption  is  dropped  many  different  alternative  formulations  of (3)  are  possible, 
depending  on  the  way  expectations  are  formed  (e.g.  rational  expectations,  adaptive 
expectations,  etc.).·  Clark  and  Freeman  (1986),  Hamermesh  (1993)  among  others 
investigated  and  reviewed  those  issues.  Several  approaches  are  possible  here.  One 
approach shown by Machin, Manning and Meghir (1992) is  to start from an intertemporal 
optimisation problem, incorporating a hiring function,  trade union preferences over wages 
and  employment and  to  derive  the  Euler  equations.  This  approach  aims  at testing  one 
specific  model  about  firm  and  union  behaviour.  Another  approach  would  be  to  take  a 
fairly  general  starting  point  without  putting  any  a  priori  restrictions  on  the  dynamic 
structure of the  model or coefficients.  This  approach aims  at "matching"  the data  in the 
best possible way  without necessarily testing a specific theoretical model.  If the aim is  to 
obtain some idea of the wage elasticity of labour demand the second approach is probably 
2Nickell  (1986)  gives  a  comprehensive  overview  of  dynamic  models  of  labour 
demand. 
4 not a bad one.  It is  the  latter which we  will follow  in this  paper.  A general  formulation 
would result in an unrestricted labour demand equation of the following form, 
(4)  L=Cons+~l (XL  .+~ AW  .+~ y.r  .+~4 o.y  . 
t  L...Ji=O  I  t-l  L...Ji=O  PI  t-l  L...Ji=O  I  t-l  L...Ji=O  I  t-l 
Equation  (4)  encompasses  several  assll..'11ptions  about  expectations.  For instance  rational 
expectations would boil down to  (4)  but with exclusion of 4-2'  Lt_3,  etc.  and with specific 
restrictions  on the other coefficients (e.g. Hamermesh,1993, p 251  for more details).  The 
advantage of using (4)  is  that it allows one to  infer the  dynamics of lagged adjustment in 
a  general  way.  What  is  not  possible  to  infer  from  equation  (4)  is  the  asymmetry  of 
adjustment costs.  For instance,  as  shown by  Pfann and  Palm (1993)  asymmetric  adjust-
ment  costs  play  an  important  role  in  the  explanation  of  unbalanced  labour  demand 
between booms and recessions. 
In the above specifications it is  assumed that factor  costs  are  exogenously given.  This  is 
not a bad assumption if the supply of labour is  perfectly elastic. However if this is not the 
case then wages  will depend on employment as  well.  Moreover there are many alternative 
ways  possible in which wages  can be determined endogenously.  For instance in the  case 
of trade  unions,  bargaining  over wages  and  employment  will  lead  to  a  particular  wage 
which  is  different  from  the  market  clearing  wage  level.  In  this  case  wages  will  also 
depend  on  the  employment  levels.  Similarly,  firms  might  consider  paying  efficiency 
wages  which will result in a higher wage than the market clearing wage.  The payment of 
efficiency wages might depend on the number of employees in a firm.  The larger the firm 
the  harder it is  to monitor workers  and the more incentive the  firm has  to  pay efficiency 
wages.  These  condierations  can  be  modelled  in  various  ways  by  making  assumptions 
about union preferences and/or the way in which efficiency wages  are paid.  We will take 
this into account when we estimate our labour demand functions. 
Another objection of the  above  description is  that firms  are  assumed  to  be price  takers. 
An  alternative  modelling  strategy  would  take  into  account  a  price  setting  firm  as  in 
Layard and  Nickell  (1986).  For instance,  a price  setting firm  facing  a constant elasticity 
5 of demand curve would choose employment as  a follows, 
(5) 
where  N*  stands  for  desired  level  of employment (rather than log employment),  w is  the 
unit labour cost,  K is  t..he  capital stock and if is  a measure  of expected  demand for the 
firm's  product  relative  to  potential  output  (as  in  Arellano  and  Bond,  1991).  Again, 
equation  (5)  can  be  rewritten  taking  into  account  costly  adjustment  of  labour.  For 
instance,  log  linearizing  (5)  and  assuming  quadratic  adjustment  costs  of  the  form 
(1I2)(Nit  - Nit_,)2,  where  Nit  stands for the level of employment, then a log-linear approxi-
mation to the Euler equation for a profit maximising firm i at time t amounts to a version 
of equation (4)  with capital instead of (he  cost of capital entering as  one of the explanato-
ry variables. 
In this  section  we  briefly  reviewed  the  main theoretical  approaches  to  estimate  employ-
ment equations,  without really deriving  the  various theories.  Since  the  main purposes  of 
this  paper  is  to  obtain  an  idea  about  the  short  and  long  run  wage  elasiticity  without 
imposing  any  theoretical  restrictions  we  do  not  develop  this  any  further  but  refer  to 
Layard,  Nickell and Jackman (1991), Lockwood and Manning (1989), Konings and Walsh 
(1994)  and  Nickell,  Vaniomaki  and  Wadhwani  (1995)  for  a  discussion  and  analysis  of 
some  of the  theoretical  points  mentioned.  In our  empirical  methodology,  however,  we 
implicitly  take  those  considerations  into  account  by  appropriatly  instrumenting the  wage 
and other variables. 
III.  Data, Econometric Model and Methodology 
The  dataset  we  have  at  our  disposal  is  a  unique  firm  level  panel  data  set  covering  all 
firms which have to  submit full company accounts to  the Central Accounts Administration 
in Belgium.  This means that all  companies with more than 100  employees are automati-
cally  included  in  the  sample.  Other  firms  are  selected  if two  of the  following  three 
criteria are  met:  number of employees,  total  assets  and  sales  exceed  respectively  50,  85 
6 million Belgian francs  and 170 million Belgian francs.  The dataset covers manufacturing 
as  well  as  service  industries  except  banks,  insurance  companies  and  hospitals.  The 
sample is  restricted to firms which have at least four consecutive time observations.  This 
gives us  a panel dataset of more than 3000 large Belgian firms over the period 1986-94. 
All key variables are  taken from the  published annual accounts of the companies conside-
red.  Value  added  is  used  as  a  measure  for  output.  Vie  prefer  to  use  tL1.is  measure 
because  it  eliminates  the  problem  of  comparing  companies  with  different  vertical 
integration structures.  Employment is given by the mean number of employees in a given 
year and consists of managing directors, white and blue collar workers.  Unit labour costs 
are  total  labour  costs  (taxes  and  social  charges  inc~uded)  divided  by  the  number  of 
employees.  Capital  is  proxied  by  the  capital  stock  (  the  summed  book  values  of the 
different fixed assets components) at the end of the year. 
Table  1 shows  the  summary statistics  for  some  key  variables  in  1994.  Average employ-
ment  in  1994  amounts  to  320.  In  1994,  the  unit  labour  cgst  in  the  average  firm  is 
1,048,000 BF  and  the  unit  employer  contribution  is  401,900  BF.  Thus  the  employer's 
contribution  to  social  security  accounts  for  40 %  of the  total  unit  labour  cost  in  the 
average  firm  in our  sample  in  1991.  In figure  1  we  show  the  distribution  of the  unit 
labour  cost  in  1994.  From figure  1 we  can see  that  there  is  substantial  inter-firm wage 
dispersion.  In figure  2  and  3  we  show  some  general  macro  trends  related  to  our data. 
Figure 2 shows  the evolution of the  unit labour cost,  employer contribution and employ-
ment  in the  median firm  in our sample  in  each  year.  While  median employment stayed 
relatively  constant,  the  unit  labour  costs  and  employer  contributions  increased  with  the 
former  raising more,  especially  in the  late  90's.  This  is  also  clear in  figure  3  where  the 
corresponding  growth rates  are  plotted.  It seems  that employment growth adjusts  with a 
time  lag  to  changes  in  costs.  Finally,  there  is  substantial  heterogeneity  between  firms 
concerning  employment  behaviour  present  in  the  data.  Table  2  shows  that  on average 
there  are  4.3%  new jobs created each year,  while 4.4%  of the  existing jobs are destroy-
ed.  Thus  the  gross job reallocation rate  amounts  to  8.8 %.  Subtracting the  absolute value 
of the net employment growth gives a measure of job turbulence which is  independend of 
aggregate  movements  in  employment.  In  other  words  it  gives  an  indication  of  firm 
7 heterorgeneity.  We  call  it,  consistent with  the  literature,  the  excess job reallocation rate 
and  is  is  7.3 %.  In  other  words,  at  all  times,  irrespective  of the  business  cycle  firms 
simultaneously  create  and  destroy jobs.  Figure 4  shows  the  evolution of those  gross  job 
flows over time. 
Since we  follow  a large cross-section of firms  over time it is  useful to  have some idea of 
the  structure of the panel.  What matters  in this  respect is  the number of continuous  time 
periods  we  observe  one  particular firm.  In our estimation we  required  that firms  had  to 
have  at  least  four  consecutive  time  periods.  Table  3  shows  the  basic  structure  of the 
panel.  Table 3 shows that the panel  is unbalanced and that most firms  are observed for at 
least 7 continuing years. 
The econometric  model  we  shall  estimate  is  derived from  the  previous section.  A  static 
model of long run demand for labour adjusted to  allow for firm heterogeneity would give 
the following testable equation, 
(6) 
All  variables  are  in  natural  logarithm  and  subscript  i  denotes  firm  i  while  subscript  t 
denotes  year,  fixi  stands  for  an  unobservable  firm  specific  effect.  This  fixed  effect 
represents  firm heterogeneity.  It could reflect different technologies for different firms,  it 
could  reflect different managerial  skills  or it  still  could  reflect  some  other unobservable 
fixed  firm  specific  characteristic.  The  Eit  are  assumed  to  have  finite  moments  and  in 
particular E(  EiJ  =  E(  EitEis)  =  0 for t ~  s.  Since we  do  not observe the unit cost of capital 
we proxy this with the capital stock in firm  i at time t.  The output variable,  Yit,  is  proxied 
by value added. 
We  do  not  observe  the  firm  fixed  effect,  yet  it  is  potentially  correlated  with  the  other 
explanatory variables  - not taking it  into  account would yield inconsistent estimates of the 
other parameters.  One way  to  control  for  this  is  to  estimate  (6)  in first difference form, 
yielding 
8 (7) 
In  the  estimation  we  consider  the  wage  as  endogenous  and  we  also  experimented  with 
assuming  capital  and  value  added  as  endogenous.  The  above  formulations  are  static. 
Taking  into  account  the  theoretical  background  of the  previous  section  we  will  also 
estimate a general dynamic model as  in equadon (4). 
The  estimation  technique  we  used  is  the  General  Methods  of Moments  technique  as 
developed  by  Arellano  and  Bond  (1991).  The  advantage  of using  this  method  over other 
commonly used panel data estimation techniques  lies  in its  efficient use  of the  number of 
instruments  generated  for  endogenous  explanatory  variables.  For  instance,  in  a  first 
differenced model valid instruments for the differenced labour cost in (7)  in year  1990 is 
the  level  of the  labour cost  in 1988  since  this  is  not  correlated  with  the  diffenced  error 
term  in  1990.  Table  4  shows  in  a  schematic  way  of how  the  number  of instruments 
increases  as  the panel progresses.  In order to  test the  validity of the  instruments a Sargan 
test  of  over-identifying  restrictions  is  computed  and  is  asymptotically  x2  distributed. 
Because  we  will  estimate the  model in first differenced form equation (7)  will  show first 
order serial correlation.  However,  what matters  in a first differenced model is  the absence 
of second  order  serial  correlation  if the  error  term  in  the  levels  equation  (6)  is  white 
noise.  Therefore,  a test of second-order serial correlation is  reported and  is  asymptotically 
N(O,I)  distributed.  In the  estimation  of (7)  we  also  included  time  dummies  and  eight 
regional  dummies,  refering  to  the  provinces  in  Belgium.  The  time  dummies  capture 
common  aggregate  effects,  like  the  state  of  the  business  cycle,  while  the  regional 
dummies  capture  the  various  development  stages  in  the  provinces  in  Belgium.  We  also 
experimented with including industry variables,  but they turned out to be insignificant. 
IV. Results 
Table  5 shows  the  results  of estimating a static  model  and  a partial adjustment model  as 
in  equation  (3).  Because  we  estimated  the  model  in  first  differences  and  because  of the 
nature in which instruments are generated the  estimation refers to  the period 1989-94.  We 
9 started  in the  first  column with a  static  long  run labour  demand  function.  The wage  is 
treated  as  an endogenous  explanatory  variable  and the  instruments  used are  all  available 
moment restrictions  on the wage from t-2  backwards.  The second order serial correlation 
test does  not perform badly,  yet it is  significant at the  10%  critical level suggesting that 
some  dynamics  is  not taking  into  account.  We  therefore  continued  with  estimating  the 
simplest  dynamic  model  possible  in  column  (2)  and  (3).  Since  the  lagged  dependend 
variable is  included and it is  a first differenced model we need to  instmment it appropria-
tely.  Also  the  wage  is  again  treated  as  endogenous.  As  instruments  we  included  all 
available  moment restrictions  on employment and  labour cost from  t-2  backwards.  Both 
the  second  order serial correlation test and  the  Sargan test of instrument  validity  accept 
the  model  specification.  In  column  (3)  we  also  included  industry  dummies  and  the 
estimated coefficients seem to be robust to common industry effects. 
From column (2)  and (3)  it shows  that the  short run wage  elasticity is  unitiy in absolute 
value.  This  is  quite  high when we  compare  short run wage  elasticities  (about -0.15) for 
Belgium based  on macro economic  time  series.  This  is  also  true for  the  long  run wage 
elasticity.  The  long  run elasticity  is  -1.23,  which  is  again  much  higher  than  previous 
estimates  (about  -0.50)  (see  Sneessens  and  Dreze,  1986;  Sneessens  and  Mehta,  1990). 
The  output elasticity  is  about  0.50 suggesting  increasing  returns  to  scale  in production. 
This  makes  sense  given that the data  cover  all  large  firms  in Belgium  (employing more 
than 50 employees).  Note also that the adjustment of employment takes place rapidly,  the 
adjustment parameter on employment,  refering  to  equation (2),  the  estimated  adjustment 
parameter is  0.80. In the last column of table  5  we  test for  robustness  of the coefficients 
over time.  In particular we are interested in different employment responses  in booms vs. 
recessions  as  suggested  by  Goubert,  Heylen  and  Omey  (1995).  We  therefore  interacted 
the variables with a dummy equal to  1 if the year of the observation refers  to  1991,92,93 
and  94,  the  recession years.  First,  none  of the  coefficients  for  the  recession  sub  period 
seem  to  be  significantly  different from  zero,  except capital.  While  in  booms  there  is  a 
positive  relationship  between  capital  and  employment,  in  recessions  this  relationship  is 
reversed  and  becomes  negative.  This  is  not  surprising  if in  recessions  employment  is 
reduced,  while  the  capital  stock  remains  fixed.  Thus  in recessions  firms  become  more 
capital  intensive,  presumably because  it is  more costly to  adjust capital.  Although for the 
10 other variables  there  does  not seem to  be a significant difference between recessions  and 
booms  it is  worth noting that the estimated short run wage elasticity in the boom is  -0.87 
which is  lower than the overall estimate of -1.0 and  given a t-statistic in the recessionary 
years of about 1 it suggests  that in booms the  wage elasticity is  smaller in absolute value 
than in recessions.  This  is  a hypothesis worth further exploring if more data are available 
in the time dimension. 
We  next go one step further and estimate a more general dynamic model,  as  suggested by 
equation (4)  and  treating the  other explanatory variables  as  endogenous  as  well.  In table 
(6)  we report in the first column a general dynamic employment equation,  which could be 
derived  from  a  model  in  which  firms  set  prices,  facing  quadratic  adjustment  costs  of 
labour  and  rational  expectations.  Similar  Euler  equations  are  reported  in  Arellano  and 
Bond  (1991).  In the  first  column only the  wage  and  employment are  treated  as  endoge-
nous  variables.  The  short  run  wage  elasticity  is  again  -1.0  and  the  long  run  wage 
elasticity  is  -1.25, very similar as  the  results  reported  in table 5.  It is  interesting to  note 
the  dynamic  structure  of the  employment  equation.  We  can  see  that  most  adjustment 
occurs after one year.  In the second column we  treated the  other explanatory variables  as 
endogenous as  well.  However,  the second order serial correlation test rejects the model in 
this  case,  suggesting  a misspecification.  In this  case,  the  short  run  wage  elasticity  is  a 
little above unity, while the long run approaches 2 . Yet,  given the bad performance of the 
second  order  serial  correlation  test  we  prefer  to  work  with  the  assumptions  of the  first 
column. 
The reported short run wage elasticity of -1  and the  long  run wage  elasticity of -1. 25  are 
drastically higher than initially  was  believed for  the  Belgium economy.  Thus  a reduction 
of the unit labour cost of 10%  would increase employment by  10%  or about 30 new jobs 
in  the  average  firm.  This  means  that  for  our  sample  about  90,000  new  jobs  could  be 
created  by  reducing  the  labour  cost  in  by  10 %.  The  reasons  why  these  results  are 
different are most likely related to  the better use of available data and  the  nature of micro 
econometric panel data.  In this  study  we  are  able to  take  into  account firm heterogeneity. 
This  is  crucial  given that  recent  research  shows  how  important  firm  heterogeneity  is  in 
the  behaviour  of job  creation  and  destruction  and  more  generally  in  analysing  firm 
11 growth.  Firm heterogeneity might be  the consequence of various  aspects,  it could reflect 
underlying  efficiency  differences  between firms,  it  could  reflect  unmeasurable  manage-
ment  skills  which  are  fairly  fixed  over  time,  it  could  also  be  a  consequence  of the 
strategic interactions between firms.  Another advantage of the current approach lies in the 
way  in which  labour  costs  are  treated.  We  explicitly  took  into  account  the  endogenous 
nature of wage determination.  Especially in large firms  in Belgium this  will be important 
because large finns either will have unions bargaining over wages and employment and/or 
pay efficiency wages.  By using micro economic data we are able to separate out common 
aggregate  effects,  common regional  effects  and  idiosyncratic  effects  on the  demand for 
labour.  Finally,  we did not impose  any restrictions  on the coefficients  which could have 
been  done  if one  wanted  to  test  a  particular  model.  This  was  not  the  purpose  of the 
present paper,  instead  we obtained  an estimate  for the  labour cost elasticity free  of any 
particular restrictions (see also Clark and Freeman,  1980). 
The results  in this paper are probably not typical  for the Belgian economy,  but are  most 
likely  the same for similar economies where labour costs  are high due to high employer 
contributions  and  where  bargaining  is  an  important  part  of  the  wage  determination 
process. Konings and Vandenbussche (1995) report for the UK a long run elasticity of 
-0.82 using  a  panel  data  set  of large  firms  over the  period  1982-89.  Similar  estimates 
using  micro  studies  are  also  reported  for  other countries  (see  Hamermesh,  1993  for  an 
overview). 
The reported estimates could have important consequences for economic policy.  The fact 
that labour demand is  more responsive to  changes  in the cost of labour than initially was 
believed  suggests  that  particular  policy  measures  like  employment tax  credits,  reducing 
employer's contribution,  etc.  will have  a proportional positive impact on the demand for 
labour  in Belgium  in the  short run and  a  more  than proportional positive  impact  in the 
long  run.  It is  clear  from  the  results  reported  here  that  substantial  net  employment 
creation can be established by reducing labour costs via reducing employer contributions. 
If the  net  wage  the  worker  receives  is  not affected  there  will  be  no  increase  in wage 
inequality,  demand will  not be affected  while at the same time employment in firms  will 
be  increased.  The  reported  estimates  suggest  that  basic  market  mechanisms  could  be 
12 applied to  generate employment. 
V.  Conclusion 
In this  paper we  used firm level  panel data to  estimate  wage  elasticities  in Belgium.  The 
results are striking.  The short run wage elasicity is  -1.0 while the long run elasticiy is 
-1.25.  These  estimates  are  much  higher  than  was  initially  believed  based  on  macro 
economic time  series  data.  We  experimented with alternative  functional  forms  and  found 
that the dynamic nature of labour demand is  fairly  simple with most adjustment occuring 
via employment. The estimated coefficients are robust to those alternative forms. 
These new results could have an important impact on economic policy and wage negotiati-
ons  between  the  social  partners  in  Belgium,  all  aimed  at  stimulating  employment.  It 
suggests  that any  measure  reducing  labour costs  will have  big  effects  on job creation in 
large  Belgium  firms.  Most likely,  similar results  will  hold  for  other  European  countries 
with high labour costs.  We suggest that the problem of high labour costs could in the long 
run  have  drastic  effects  on  employment  generation.  We  did  not  address  the  issue  of 
increased  international competition from  low  wage  countries  and most likely  at this  stage 
the  impact  of for  example  competition  from  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  is  still  fairly 
modest.  However,  the  awareness  of the  impact  of labour  costs  on  the  job  generation 
process  is  important especially for  the  long  run when new  economies  will want to  obtain 
an  increasingly  larger share  of the  international  market.  Those  issues  rank high  on  our 
research agenda. 
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15 Table 1:  averages  in 1991 
mean 
unit labour cost  877,000 
unit employer contribution  335,000 
employment  278 
value added  568,082,000 
Table 2:  Gross Job Flows in Belgium 
job creation  job destruction  job reallocation  net employment  excess job 
rate  rate  rate  growth  reallocation 
0.043 (0.013)  0.044 (0.004)  0.088 (0.011)  -0.0002 (0.016)  0.073 (0.015) 
Table 3:  Structure of the panel 
number of consecutive periods we observe the  number of firms 
same firm 
4  591 
5  441 
6  426 
7  1196 
8  921 
9  29 
total number of firms in the sample  3,586 
16 Table 4:  Instruments for the wage 
variable in year  valid instruments available 
LlWi88  W i86 
LlWi89  Wi86,  W i87 
LlWi90  W i86 '  W i87 '  W i88 
etc.  II 
LlWi91  W i86 '  W i87'  W i88,  W i89 
r etc. 
17 Table 5:  Results, dependend variable Lit 
explana- (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
tory 
variables 
L it-l  0.19  0.19  0.23  -
(0.028)  (0.028)  (0.084) 
Yit  0.50  0.47  0.47  0.32 
(0.034)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.15) 
Wit  -1.04  -1.016  -1.010  -0.87 
(0.10)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.24) 
Kit  0.014  0.015  0.015  0.169 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.06) 
L it-l(9l-94)  -0.107  - - -
(0.098) 
Yit(9l-94)  0.234  - - -
(0.214) 
Wit(9l-94)  -0.261  - - -
(0.270) 
K it(9l-94)  -0.238 
- - -
(0.093) 
time  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
dummies 
regional  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
dummies 
industry  No  No  Yes  Yes 
dummies 
SOC test  -1.558  -0.922  -0.942  -0.900 
Sargan  35.38  64.11  65.31  44.0 
test  (df=26)  (df=52)  (df=52)  (df=48) 
number  3604  3604  3604  3604 
of firms 
Note:  lagged employment IS  mstrumented usmg all avaIlable moment restrIctions  from t-2 
backwards,  wage  is  instrumented  using  all  available  moment  restrictions  from  t-2 
backwards, heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in brackets. 
18 Table 6 
explanatory variables  (1)  (2) 
L it-1  0.36* (0.05)  0.65* (0.05) 
Lit-2  -0.02* (0.009)  -0.01 (0.013) 
Yit  0.46* (0.02)  0.49* (0.08) 
Yit-l  -0.05** (0.032)  -0.31* (0.06) 
Yit-2  0.013**  (0.008)  -0.004 (0.011) 
Wit  -1.05* (0.08)  -1.16 (0.108) 
W it-1  0.20* (0.06)  0.44* (0.05) 
Kit  0.015* (0.006)  -0.049 (0.04) 
K it-1  0.004 (0.011)  -0.03 (0.03) 
K it-2  -0.004 (0.003)  -0.002 (0.005) 
SOC  0.656  1.531 
Sargan test  62.33 (df=50)  41.23 (48) 
Number of firms  3604  3604 
Note:  All equatIOns  mclude tune,  regIOnal  and  sectoral dummIes,  * stands  for sIgmficant 
at the  5 % critical level.  In equation (1)  we treated the wage and  employment as  endoge-
nous  variables. In equation (2)  we  also treated the other variables as  endogenous and used 
as  instruments the level and differenced value added  in period t-2,  the level and  differen-













Figure 1:  Distribution unit labour cost in 1991 
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20 Figure 2:  The Evolution of employment, labour cost and employer contribution 
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21 Figure 3:  The evolution of growth in employment, labour cost and employer contribution 
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